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Preface
These papers represent three areas of my interest as 
a graduate student at the University of Montana: humanities,
political theory, and aesthetics. As such they are attempts 
to restore the mythic unity of instrumental and critical 
reason, technology, and art through a reformulation of the 
concept of labor.
The first paper discusses the emergence of instru­
mental reason in Greek thought, and poses the question for 
a philosophical reunification of the practical and the moral. 
It is my contention that within the Western tradition, instru­
mental reason emerges as controlling, and becomes a normative 
force through the great Aristotelean tradition.
The second paper posits labor as an ontological 
category of human existence, and discusses the possibilities 
of considering labor in its full context as something more 
than mere economic activity. The historical move from the 
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom is the develop­
ment of reason from its instrumental footing in economic 
activity to its critical possibility in art.
The third paper is a search for the ground of critical 
reason in modern technological society, and is an exposition 
of the thought of Jurgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin.
Habermas argues that the ground of critical theory is
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symbolic interaction, rather than the labor process under­
stood as an ontological category of human existence. I 
argue that authentic and autonomous art is the unspoken 
paradigm in Habermas' model: human intersubjectivity is
the field for its operation.
Expository papers naturally owe a great deal to what 
they exposit, and I am therefore indebted to the work of 
Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Haberams, and Walter Benjamin, to 
the guidance of Professor Ron Perrin and the Philosophy 
Department, and to the Intensive Humanities Program for pro­
viding the intersubjective fields in which these ideas took 
root. Naturally any inaccuracies that may be found in these 
papers are my own.
11
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R E F LE C T IO N S  ON GREEK CONSCIOUSNESS
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Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an 
event that took place in primordial Time, the 
fabled time of the 'beginnings'. In other words, 
a myth tells how, through the deeds of Super­
natural Beings, a reality came into existence, 
be it the whole of reality, the cosmos, or only 
a fragment of reality— an island, a species of 
plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an 
institution. Myth, then, is always an account 
of 'creation'; it relates to how something was 
produced, began to be. . . . I n  short, myths 
describe the various and sometimes dramatic 
breakthroughs of the sacred into the World. It 
is this sudden breakthrough of the sacred that 
really establishes the World and makes it what 
it is today. Furthermore, it is as a result of 
the intervention of supernatural Beings that man 
himself is what he is today, a mortal, sexed, 
and cultural being.
Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality
The Poetic Tradition : Homer
Truth emerges out of darkness into light. The emer­
gence happens in time and is lived, perceived, and recorded 
by those who recognize it and feel its compulsion. At no 
time is everything revealed to anyone, rather truth reveals 
itself gradually, throughout human history, such that at 
any particular moment what is revealed is incomplete. Incom­
plete, not false. The incompleteness of truth in mythic 
form has often been called, by those more sure of themselves, 
"childish anthropomorphism," by which is meant that those 
more sure of themselves are adult and objective observers, 
removed from the shadows of time.
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Legend has it that Tiresias discovered the secret of 
opposites by accident one day, while wandering in the woods. 
He came upon two copulating serpents, separated them by a 
stroke of his stick, and thus provoked their wrath and was 
changed from a man to a woman. He lived as a woman for 
seven years, when he happened upon the two again, and hoping 
that by again striking them with his stick, he would incur 
the same punishment. This he did, and was restored to his 
former gender. Having now experienced both dimensions of 
human sexuality, Tiresias was called upon to settle a dis­
pute between Zeus and Hera: Zeus contending that women take
more joy in sex than men, and Hera the opposite. Because of 
Tiresias' recent experience with the opposites, he knew the 
answer and took the part of Zeus, whereupon he was blinded 
by the angry goddess. As compensation and with irony, Zeus 
then gave Tiresias the opposite sight, prophecy.
The knowledge of opposites was greater even than the 
knowledge of Zeus and his queen, and the sight now pos­
sessed by Tiresias was itself knowledge of a higher order, 
for it was knowledge of the unrevealed, of the darkness, 
"lunar wisdom."^ Tiresias, from this point, plays an impor­
tant role in the revelation and articulation of truth in the 
Greek world. Blind to the physical manifestations of what 
has already been revealed, he becomes the seer, the one who 
sees into the future by recognizing truth in darkness, and
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shadow in light.
The Homeric world is primarily the world of sunlight, 
but it is sunlight that shines upon the earth without the 
brilliance that eliminates shadow. There is shadow in 
Homer's world, and failure to recognize it is fatal, as is 
the failure to recognize dissemblance: things are not
always what they seem. Dissemblance is Odysseus' great 
tactic, and one he shares with Athena, the grey-eyed god­
dess. Great danger is also great power to those who master 
it, but no mortal power however great can ever master the 
uncertainties and dangers and shadows of the Greek cosmos.
The recognition of man at the center of sun-drenched 
Greece is made through the power and clarity of poetic 
vision :
Sing in me Muse, and through me tell the story 
of that man skilled in all ways of contending, 
the wanderer, harried for years on end, 
after he plundered the stronghold 
on the proud height of Troy.
The Homeric vision, handed down through centuries of oral
tradition, is immediately sensuous, devoid of the corruption
of theoretical patter, infused with the blood and smoke of
battle. It is the body, not the mind that carries Odysseus
on his journey, and the distance between thought and action
collapses in the purity of nature where nothing is assumed.
The images of that Greek world dance for us more vividly
than our own reality, and that through translation from a
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"dead language." It is the poetic sensibility, so akin to
the state of grace, that defies theoretical circumscription
by its elusive vitality, and drives the Homeric pathos to
us through all the intervening centuries, that informs the
Greek perception of nature.
The perception of nature displayed in the Odyssey is
characterized by a remarkable openness to the strange and the
mysterious. Nothing here is accidental, and one ignores
the omens of the natural world at great peril, as when the
assembly of Ithakans foolishly chooses to ignore the eagles
launched by Zeus to warn of the impending slaughter:
Old man, go tell the omens for your children 
at home, and try to keep out of trouble.
I am more fit to interpret this than you are.
Bird life aplenty is found in the sunny air, 
not all of it significant.^
Unfortunately for Eurymakhos this bird life was most signi­
ficant, but since he was convinced to the contrary he could 
not see despite the "sunny air."
The openness to the strange and mysterious extended 
past receptivity to natural phenomenon to the unusual and 
foreign in man himself. Perhaps it was because of the geo­
graphy, or the sea-faring nature of the Greek economy, or 
simply the "childish wonder" at the dawn of civilization, 
whatever the reason, the Homeric Greeks institutionalized 
hospitality. Odysseus was constantly at the mercy of what­
ever land he found himself in— including his own, yet with
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few exceptions was accorded the finest accommodations by his 
fellow humans. This demonstration of altruism was more than 
pragmatic, although there was certainly the necessity for 
reciprocal aid in a sea-faring culture, it was an extension 
of the Greek sense of life, the respect for the diversity 
and richness of human experience. One simply does not 
refuse to recognize and acknowledge reality as it presents 
itself, and to exalt the diversity of cultures and experience 
without denigrating one's own roots. Telemakhos speaks well
4to Menelaos concerning his "islands tilted in the sea," 
in obvious reaction to the homesickness that has begun to 
take its toll, but he notes well the great horse kingdom 
and benefits from the alliance.
Compare the homecoming given Odysseus as he appears 
to the swineherd and as he appears at his own home as a 
beggar. On one hand there is respect for the age and travels 
of the poor beggar, on the other ridicule and insults. The 
two reactions are indicative of the two ways of engaging 
the world; the one with open curiosity and respect; the 
other with closed hostility and arrogance. Compare also 
the fate of the swineherd with that of the suitors— both 
are rewarded accordingly, the one for his openness and 
respect, the other for their hubris.
The Phiakian attitude toward hospitality is ambiguous, 
and gives us our first inkling that something might be amiss
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in the technological kingdom. Odysseus needs the protection
of Pallas Athena to insure his safe passage through the
city to the great hall of King Alkinoos and Queen Arêtê:
You must not stare at these people, or be 
inquisitive.
They do not care for strangers in this 
neighborhood; 
a foreign man will get no welcome here.
The only things they trust are the racing 
ships
Poseidon gave, to sail the deep blue sea 
like white wings in the sky, or a flashing 
thought.
Their minds are firmly fixed on the technology of sea-power, 
and that single-minded concentration has made them truly 
formidable sailors— concentration, that is, and the blessings 
of Poseidon. As for the strange and mysterious, they have 
not so much curiosity, unless it can somehow be harnessed 
to the technology of sailing, and as for foreign visitors, 
they offer passage from their land to all who are blown upon 
it, but entrance into their land, assimilation into their 
culture is unthinkable.
The technology of Phiakia is marvelous, and Odysseus 
marks it well before entering the great Queen's mansion.
The orchards and vineyards and gardens with their engineered 
irrigation systems (gifts of heaven to Alkinoos, the muse 
informs us), the tooled and precious doors to the mansion, 
and the skillful weaving of the maids-in-waiting indicate to 
Odysseus a people industrious and yet quite proud of their 
industry. He abases himself before them in the ashes, this
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great warrior skilled in the ways of contending, and thereby 
wins their hospitality, which is considerable.
Yet there is something wrong here, in this land of 
industry and techne. Something about the way the society 
is centered strikes us as all confused, and baleful. They 
have named themselves for the functions they perform:
Beacher, Hullman, Sterman, Shipwrightson, and the infamous 
Seareach whose hubris invokes Odysseus' anger. It is as if 
they have no identity apart from the instrumental force they 
exert in the shipping industry, and they compensate for 
this lack of substance by staging track and field games and 
by their dancing. But we notice here a country of spectators 
and performers, and by far the majority spectate. Passive 
entertainment, non-engagement characterizes their leisure, 
as if the effort of being the world's greatest sailors were 
too much, and no other leisure were possible. This special­
ized existence is the stuff of which hubris is formed.
I'fhen the arrogant Seareach taunts Odysseus into com­
peting in the track and field events, his foolishness is 
answered:
That was uncalled for, friend, you talk like 
a fool.
The gods deal out no gift, this one or any—
birth, brains, or speech— to every man alike.
Indeed, the gods deal out gifts, there is little call for ex­
cessive pride in their exercise. Man may properly take pride, 
but not in what has been given him. And that is precisely
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the point, how can a man recognize that which he may properly 
claim as his own from that which has been given? And if he 
cannot recognize the difference, prudence dictates modesty. 
The absence of this attitude, the forgetfulness of the 
sailors as to the origin of this great gift proves fatal.
They " . . .  scud the open sea, with never a thought of
7going down," and gradually come to believe their gift is 
their own doing, thus invoking the terrible anger of Poseidon 
who turns their ship to stone in the midst of the beautiful 
harbor, an eternal reminder of the follies of false pride.
In nascent form the Phiakian society embodies the 
theoretical challenge to domination, although Homer refuses 
to name it, indeed cannot name it yet. The instrumental 
thinking that characterizes their attitude toward nature 
foreshadows the later forms of domination that have become 
so familiar to our modern age.
The Greek gods of the Homeric tradition are poetic 
expressions of nature and fate, they are not causal explana­
tions for natural phenomenon as some recent scholars would 
have us believe.* Absent from that world are the modern 
notions of cause and effect and the theoretical structures 
of mind that attend the possibilities of changing the world
*This argument lies outside the scope of this paper, but com­
pare the work of Mircea Eliade, Edith Hamilton, and Joseph 
Campbell for the flavor of the differences.
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to suit human conventions. Poseidon does not cause the sea
to rage and the earth to shake, he IS the sea raging and the
earth shaking, and man, if he would remain among the living,
must listen to his world and recognize his place within it.
The grey-eyed goddess speaks frequently and eloquently to
Odysseus and Telemakhos, and her messages do not fall quietly
in the dust because both men are listening to their world,
and hearing its secrets.
With this Athena left him
as a bird rustles upward, off and gone.
But as she went she put new spirit in him, 
a new dream Of his father, clearer now, 
so that he marveled to himself 
divining that a god had been his guest.
Then godlike in his turn he joined the 
suitors.°
To hear the gods when they speak is to become godlike, but to 
hear one must listen, and to listen one must feel a lack of 
certainty, a longing for truth and a curiosity for shadow.
To be overly concerned with the revealed is to languish in 
the certainty of ignorance and unfulfillment. Man needs to 
exceed himself, to wander beyond and beneath his known and 
comfortable confines, his senses razored to the slightest 
nuance.
To wander beneath is to know the past poetically; to 
visit the land of the dead and to converse with the "shades" 
enfuses history with a sensuous richness and a shadowy reality 
that is lost in the theoretical visions of modernity. The 
theoretic historiography treats of the past as impersonal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
and abstract— cultural forces that collide and expand and 
unfold in the eventual present moment. That understanding 
lacks the existential import of the Homeric vision. Odysseus 
wanders to the shadow realm of the underworld that he 
might better see his future, but he sees there not the 
forces of time, but the faint images of individual person­
alities, whose reality is diminished through visual imagery. 
Yet they speak out of the particularity of the human ex­
perience, their words have dignity and power and eloquence 
and, most of all, authority. Homer has not made prostitutes 
of his ancestors, he has not tried to dominate the past, but 
has called upon the muse to sing in him and to reveal his­
tory as it really happened, and from the point of view of 
the lived body, the embodied consciousness.
Odysseus' journey through life to eventual fulfill­
ment and resolution includes a sojourn to the realm of the 
dead. But when he returns to Ithaka he comes to another 
realm of the dead, the world of the suitors who are dead in 
life. The highest contempt is reserved for those who remain 
at home with themselves, passive and indolent, secure in 
the knowledge of good families and risking nothing. Eury­
makhos puts the suitors position succinctly:
It is a long, long time we have been waiting 
in rivalry for this beauty. We could have gone 
elsewhere and found ourselves very decent wives.
Yet one suspects the "waiting in rivalry" has been a very
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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different manner of contending than that Odysseus has en­
dured. The suitors have overcome nothing, risked nothing, 
learned nothing because they already believe themselves to 
be complete, needing only Penelope to ensure their virility. 
The gods no longer speak to them because they have stopped 
listening, and they stopped listening because they believe 
they already know the message, and that because they have 
never risked self knowledge before the awesome power of 
nature. Instead of wandering and searching, they have stag­
nated in the self-assurant complacency of good breeding and 
become corpulent on the labor of another, far, far greater 
strength and understanding, Odysseus.
To Odyssey; to wander, to journey, to exceed the 
bounds of self-knowledge by challenging the world, to dis­
cover one's identity by exceeding it, to gain one's life by 
losing it. The Homeric understanding of selfhood is perhaps 
the single most attractive feature of that primitive world.
The deepest, darkest and most vile sin one can commit is to 
BE as a suitor, to refuse self-transcendence, to wait for 
life to happen. Knowledge is based upon a commitment to the 
world, a risking of one's private, mortal and fragile self.
It cannot be gained vicariously. The electrifying slaughter 
of the suitors illustrates the point most graphically. The 
suitors had never engaged in mortal combat and were utterly 
unprepared for the sudden horrible violence, their realization
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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crept over them slowly as they fell quivering in the blood
soaked dust, pathetically, hopelessly, inexorably.
He drew to his fist the cruel head of an arrow 
for Antinoos
just as the young man leaned to lift his beauti­
ful drinking cup, 
embossed, two-handled, golden: the cup was in
his fingers: 
the wine was even at his lips: and did he
dream of death?
How could he? In that revelry amid his throng 
of friends
who would imagine a single foe— though a strong 
foe indeed—
could dare to bring death's pain on him and dark­
ness on his eyes?
Odysseus' arrow hit him under the chin
and punched up to the feathers through his throat.
Backward and down he went, letting the wine cup 
cup fall
from his shocked hand. Like pipes his nostrils 
jetted
crimson runnels, a river of mortal red, 
and one last kick upset his table 
knocking the bread and meat to soak in dusty 
blood.
The suitors sinned not only against themselves, and 
nature, and the gods, but also against Ithakian society.
"The Flower of Ithakian Youth" Odysseus calls them, the hope 
of the future. They sinned against themselves by their ar­
rogant complacency; against nature and the gods by taking 
both for granted and refusing to hear and engage their world; 
and against Ithakian society by their disrespect for Law and 
the conventions of hospitality. The recognition of human 
frailty is the root of the conventions of hospitality (one 
might argue the root of Homeric notions of god and nature
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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also), and man never seems to need those conventions so long 
as he has health, strength, and the blessings of the gods, 
but when the gods abandon us, we suffer terribly, and in that 
lonely suffering we need each other.
No man should flount the law,
but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give.
Odysseus refers to The Law here, not laws. To have contempt 
for law itself is the height of human arrogance and stupidity, 
the ultimate sin of hubris. To have contempt for Law is to 
have contempt for the human conditions that make us all 
humble before fate and the gods, it is to deny our essential 
humanity and to set oneself above the human condition, to 
assume a godly posture. That is one sin the world never 
fails to punish unmercifully.
Odysseus struggles to regain his homeland where peace, 
based on the natural order and rhythm of the world, reigns 
over a society of diversity, creativity, nobility, and power. 
Ithakian society is based upon law, both human and natural, 
and custom, the most important being the custom of hospi­
tality. The Homeric value that radiates throughout is open­
ness to the world and its unfathomable and mysterious 
nuances, and respect for the power and violence of nature—  
society being the human palliative to the unpredictability 
of individual existence. Man is not yet the political animal 
he will become in the Athenian polis, but neither is he the 
instrumental theorist he becomes in the Alexandrian Empire.
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Primitive Instrumentalism: Sophocles
The transition from Homeric Kingdom to Athenian Polis 
is marked by the transition from a poetic understanding of 
life that is grounded in immediacy and innocent openness, 
to a primitively theoretical understanding grounded in the 
problem-solving mentality of Oedipus and characterized by 
the illusion of control. The plague ravishes Sophocles' 
Athens as it ravishes Thebes, and the reaction of the 
Athenian citizenry is recognized in the reaction of the 
Theban chorus.
Oedipus has saved Thebes from the cruel Sphinx by 
solving the famous riddle, and is justly rewarded with 
Kingship— the deification of primitive instrumental thought 
and its power to control. Primitive theory replaces poetic 
sensibility; the power to abstract the world into causal 
relationships replaces the power to hear the world and find 
one's place within its mysteriousness. Primitive theory 
becomes concrete practice with the attempt to control nature 
and the gods. It purpose is not understanding but power.
The questions one asks of the world generally determine the 
answers one receives, and in the case of Thebes, the question 
has become one of expediency:
Find us our safety, find us a remedy.
Whether by counsel of the gods or men.
A King of wisdom tested in the past
Can act in a time of troubles, and act well.^^
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The Priest and the Theban chorus have become dependent upon 
Oedipus for relief from the terrible realities of life in 
the doomed city, and beg him to give them peace. They have 
become as children before the problem-solving power of 
Oedipus, and can no longer stand alone. They have abdicated 
their power to the instrumentalism of theoretical thought, 
and have thereby emasculated themselves.
See, how our lives like birds take wing.
Like sparks that fly when a fire soars.
To the shore of the god of evening.
Even in the primitive stages of its appearance, the logic 
of instrumental thought is present, its aim is the control 
of men. In its extreme forms it becomes domination, the end 
of freedom, the end of poetic existence.
The Thebans have lost touch with themselves and their 
gods, and offer only prayer to their "Dearest expectancy," 
speech in lieu of the blood sacrifice that so powerfully 
tied the Homeric Greek to a revered world.
What is God singing in his profound
Delphi of gold and shadow?
What oracle for Thebes, the sunwhipped city?
Fear ixnjoints me, the roots of my heart tremble.
The sunwhipped city basks in the icy brilliance of Oedipal 
reason, but they are incapable of acknowledging the shadow 
from which all truth emerges, the shadow that lies at the 
heart of their own existence. None can be sure of the 
source of his own engendering, the most fundamental origin 
of biological existence, and it is curious that the Odyssey
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opens with Telemakhos saying similar words to Pallas
15Athena. Sophocles could hardly have been unaware of the 
irony he was proposing, of the stark contrast between the 
sunwhipped mentality of Athens and the poetic consciousness 
of Homeric Greece. The hubris that treats its ancestors as 
prostitutes is embodied in the hubris of Oedipus, for all 
his admirable searching for the truth. Yet Oedipus searches 
for the truth of his past that he might wield it against his 
fate, and thereby gain control of destiny itself, surely a 
sin that will not go unnoticed by the gods. While Athenian 
Greece saw the legends of Homer as childish superstition, 
they were amidst the most debilitating consciousness since 
its rejection. The poetic understanding of the world they 
saw, rightly, as incomplete, its rejection in favor of its 
opposite was fatal, for here lies the nascent form of what 
will become a Dionysian frenzy; the passion for control of 
passion itself.
Oedipus' excessive pride in his theoretical prowess 
leads him to believe that possession of the truth will give 
him control of his fate. But the truth always emerges from 
shadow, and is at no time fully revealed. Man cannot wield 
reason against the oracles. No matter how brilliantly the 
fires of reason burn, they never illuminate their origins; 
about origins there must always be doubt. Failure to 
respect the shadowy realm of the past results in defilement
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for Oedipus and the Thebans, and one must say, also for the 
Athenians themselves (although their's is a very special 
case, involving defilement of one's ancestors by illumi­
nating their lives with the poverty of the immediate future 
of one's own reason). It involves the elimination of diver­
sity from the world, for by denying its existence in the 
past, one necessarily excludes it from the future.
But I say that you, with both your eyes, are 
blind:
You can not see the wretchedness of your life.
Nor in whose house you live, no, nor with whom.
Who are your father and mother? Can you tell 
me?
You do not even know the blind wrongs
That you have done them, on earth and in the 
world below.16
Primitive Theory: Socrates
Oedipus Rex was written at the time when Athenian 
society was suffering most. The plague was a real biological 
catastrophe and a pervasive social contagion. The move from 
polis to empire created a new aristocracy whose moral values 
and educational needs were at odds with the old ruling aris­
tocracy who held sway prior to the Peloponnesian wars. 
Political leadership no longer flowed in aristocratic blood 
as a matter of natural course, but rather depended largely 
on the powers of persuasion displayed by those whose aris­
tocratic values were rooted in the new commercialism. The 
highest virtue was to be successful in manipulating the new
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democracy, and for that purpose a new educational class 
arose: the Sophists.
Thq virtuous and successful life becomes the life 
that displays maximum control over political, economic and 
intellectual relationships, and while the Sophists had little 
in common with each other, they were in agreement on how 
virtue was to be demonstrated. This situation led to some 
interesting ethical arrangements since it reduced virtue 
from its transcendental and universal status to a situ­
ational and instrumental ground. The ethical relativism 
of many of the Sophists led to its contradiction: situ­
ational ethics have their own logic, and it is the logic of 
control. No matter that there is no absolute moral system 
that is for all people at all times, the guiding principle 
is to control whatever situation one finds oneself in ac­
cording to the dictates of self-interest, as in the philos­
ophy of Protagoras, for whom "man is the measure of all 
things." This in turn tended to create an homogeny that 
threatened to eliminate all diversity in Greek society; the 
destruction of Melos but one demonstration.
In contest against sophistry, Socrates attempts to 
keep the poetic understanding alive in the face of a bur­
geoning instrumentalism that threatens to reduce the 
mysteries of the world to mind-dependency. He most ade­
quately sees what is at stake in the new understanding, and
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sees it as hostile to the quality of life in the Athenian 
polis. He describes it as a form of hubris that assumes 
theoretical language by itself sufficient to explicate the 
content of experience and to manipulate that content to 
suit the conventions of a blind present.
Those who pretend to possess knowledge of such vir­
tues as piety, justice, love, equality, and courage are 
called into question by Socrates to explain themselves. As 
usually happens, the defended concepts are vacuous and con­
sequently capable of being juxtaposed in contradiction one 
to the other. What was originally thought capable of pos­
session proves to be possessed with the intangible character 
of a relationship, whose vitality is contingent upon main­
taining a reciprocity through questioning. This is the 
Socratic method, pushing constantly deeper into the given 
in an attempt to find the shadowy adumbrations of distinc­
tion, of reality, where words can no longer follow. When 
Euthyphro, for example, is convinced that he has the answer 
to the question "what is piety?" he ceases his questioning 
and rests in assurance that the matter is closed. He, like 
Oedipus, is ignorant of his ignorance and therefore doubly 
blinded to the rich mysteriousness of piety. The wise man 
is the one who knows that he does not know, and who there­
fore continues to question and allows the world to reveal 
itself.
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Themes of light and dark appear again in the Socratic
dialogues, constantly reminding us that all is not revealed,
and that much of what can be revealed can only be expressed
in mythic and poetic form;
Soon I found that it is not by wisdom that the 
poets create their works, but by a certain in­
stinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and 
prophets, who say many fine things, but under­
stand nothing of what they say.l'
The fact that poets may not "understand" what they say does 
not make what they say false, but rather indicates an in­
ability on their part to see the total context in which what 
they say has the character of truth; what they say is incom­
plete. There are varying degrees of completeness, of illumi­
nation, yet man seldom meets with the condition of total 
revelation. Truth emerges from the murky realm of appear­
ance in mysterious ways, and it would seem that Socrates has 
more sympathy for the poet who still speaks through the 
world out of existentiality than for the Sophist who manip­
ulates forms without content in an attempt to possess the 
world abstractly. Present in the poet is a kind of love 
that does not reduce itself to the desire to possess and 
manipulate; precisely what the Sophist attempts. Similarly 
in the Athenian citizenry, as it comes to us through the 
Theban chorus of Sophocles, is the inverse Sophistic ten­
dency to be possessed by the theoretical knowledge that 
obviates the insecurity of painful inquiry. Such concept­
ualizations are empty and amount to a rejection of the world
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and the assumption of deafness through pride.
Much more is given us in the erotic character of 
knowledge in the Symposium than would appear at first blush. 
If wisdom is love of knowledge, says Socrates, then we would 
do well to pay attention to the nature of love. If that 
relationship is characterized by the desire of the lover 
to possess the beloved, in the process of domination the 
desired is reduced to an object and is divested of the 
quality that makes it lovable, namely its power to freely 
reciprocate. Staleness replaces the freshness that was the 
first attraction, inertia replaces dynamic reciprocity, the 
diverse mysteriousness that injects the love relationship 
with its vitality is given over to deadening homeostasis—  
boredom. The beloved can now be wielded, but only as some­
thing inert in which is hidden the condition of bondage for 
lover and beloved alike. Bondage for the lover because he 
is enslaved by the limits of his knowledge and blind to its 
possibilities; bondage for the beloved because it has been 
silenced and petrified into one of its many dimensions. If 
the object of love is knowledge, the implication is not the 
bondage of the world but its death. The world and its 'gods' 
no longer speak because we no longer listen, and we no 
longer listen because there is no such necessity now that 
we are in possession of the truth. The openness of the 
Homeric world is closed and hubris reigns as the predominant
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mode of consciousness; a hubris most insidiously revealed 
in Athenian imperialism.
Poetry abounds in the Platonic dialogues, and at no 
point in Plato's epistemology and metaphysics is it more 
crucial than in the "Myth of the Cave." The poetic ex­
pression of the theory of forms is indicative of Platonic 
theory, still infused with a sense of the mysterious and 
grounded in the visual imagery of light and shadow, it char- 
actizes the sun as the power that informs all reality, 
illuminates it, nourishes it and throws shadows into it, 
and answers our ultimate questions. Answers our ultimate 
questions provided, of course, that we ask them, that we 
recognize the need within ourselves to probe beneath the 
apparent and utilitarian surface of our lives. We are left 
with the impression that one must return to the cave to 
force one's fellows from the realm of darkness and sub­
jectivity.
The richly ambiguous character of the realm of ap­
pearances demands a questioning openness through which 
glimpses of the real world of forms are conceivable. The 
progress through the world from shadows to the form of the 
good cannot be accomplished by anything less than a total 
giving of one's understanding to the world in a relationship 
of reciprocity that categorically precludes the possession 
of truth. Respect for the ambiguity of the lived experience
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retains the poetic sense of life found in the Homeric ex­
perience and lost in the classical age. This loss did not 
go unlamented, nor was it total; but primitive theory 
rapidly jettisoned poetry for instrumentality, openness for 
domination, wisdom for technology. This is apparent in 
Platonic thought itself, and in the interpretations of 
Platonic thought that will come.
The realm of forms will come to be seen as static, 
unchanging and eternal things, a product of the misunder­
standings of instrumental thought. The eternal character 
of the forms resides in the paradigmatic relationships they 
embody; relationships that more resemble values than objects 
existing in the nether realm. The unfortunate instrumen­
talist tendency has been to fix these relations with lan­
guage, to name them and thus render them objective and 
manipulable. Nothing could be further from the Socratic 
spirit of the early Plato.
Thus the two major connections of the Platonic tra­
dition with the Homeric are the attempts to keep the world 
open and alive through a recognition of the poverty of human 
understanding, and understanding human knowledge as an 
erotic relationship that demands a commitment into the world. 
Both are contrary to the acquisitive character of instru­
mentalist thought and to the impulse to dominate and con­
trol nature by means of which that acquisition is accom­
plished.
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Theoretical Instrumentalism; Aristotle
. . . It is not the function of the poet to
relate what has happened, but what may 
happen— what is possible according to the 
law of probability or necessity.
Aristotle, Poetics 
1451
The break between the primitive theoretical thought 
found in the writings of the early Plato and the theoretical 
instrumentalism of Aristotle becomes most apparent in the 
later writings of Aristotle, when he has moved far beyond 
the influences of the Academy. Aristotle remains a Pla- 
tonist insofar as he continues to concern himself with the 
epistemological quandry of reality and illusion, the one 
and the many, and the problem of change; but he abandons the 
early Socratic spirit in developing his Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotle took his direction from the most instru­
mentalist of the Platonic notions, the theory of forms, and 
sought to solve the "participation problem" by developing a 
teleological metaphysics that embedded form in matter as 
that toward which particular matter purposively developed.
His theory was an improvement on the Platonic theory of forms 
only so long as one remained on the level of the mundane, 
i.e., his theory adequately accounts for biological change 
only so long as one maintains the Platonic hiatus between 
matter and value. Aristotle's metaphysics is no improvement
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over the dualities of Platonic theory on the level of value 
because that toward which all matter tends is thought, and 
the source of all movement is the "unmoved mover"; nature 
become thoroughly rational.
The spiritual difference implied in Aristotle's 
metaphysics is at the heart of what is meant by "instru­
mental thought." Plato thought that reality became more 
intelligible as one's questions sharpened, as one's ability 
to interact with nature became more acute. And this acumen 
could only be acquired by a constant, unremitting attempt 
to move beyond the apparent and obvious to the ground of 
being which ultimately revealed the revealing power. Hence 
Platonic theory was explicitly utopian. Aristotle, on the 
other hand, felt the compulsion to examine reality in terms 
of particularity (inductively, if one uses the term 
advisedly), and to find therein a purpose. His attribution 
to reality of purposiveness at the outset is the hallmark of 
all instrumental thought: what is the social meaning of
attributing purposiveness to nature when that purposiveness 
is value? From the point of view of an ordered and well 
intentioned teleology, nature (and human nature) displays 
itself as an orderly array of manipulable potentialities, 
and it remains only to harness them to the services of a 
higher form. Nature, rather than a mysterious and sacred 
play of forces and relationships, might now appear as an
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ordered hierarchy of values, the major value being the 
realization of form, and the more inclusive the form, the 
more cosmic value it has. The four-fold implication for 
ethics: 1) There is one end (form) for man; 2) That end
exists in a hierarchy of other potentialities; 3) It is 
knowable; 4} It is possible to create conditions favorable 
to the realization of that form.
These four conditions taken together comprise the 
definition of domination: the instrumental implications of
hubris released from their mythic core. Aristotle does not 
show that there is only one end for man, and he certainly 
does not show that it is rational and knowable. Indeed, 
how could he know the final end of man unless he were god, 
unless he possessed the most inclusive kind of knowledge 
imaginable, unless he somehow stood at the end of the 
hierarchy of value where Plato placed the Form of the Good? 
Aristotle's philosophy is the most startling example of 
hubris in the Greek tradition, and it is made particularly 
onerous by the fourth point: that it is possible to create
conditions favorable to the realization of human potential­
ity— by manipulating the natural and social environment in 
which man finds himself.
. . . He who bids the law rule may be deemed 
to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who 
bids man rule adds an element of the beast; 
for desire is a wild beast, and passion per­
verts the minds of rulers, even when they are
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the best of men. The Law is reason unaf­
fected by desire. . . . The law has no power 
to command obedience except that of habit . . .
so that a readiness to change from old to new 
laws enfeebles the power of the law.18
Here is real evidence of the emergence of the will to con­
trol, which contravenes the Homeric tradition by assuming 
the possession of some form of truth that acts as the basis 
upon which nature and man might be dominated. In the 
attempt to purge human consciousness of the disruptive in­
fluence of beastly passion, that very passion to control 
becomes consuming and frenetic— the "control frenzy" in the 
service of Reason.
Aristotle clearly articulates the consciousness of 
the coming Alexandrian Empire, the end of hospitality toward 
the world, and the beginning of control and domination 
through a classificatory science that seeks to bring an end 
to ambiguity by naming it. No longer will men perfect them­
selves by listening to the world and being in touch with the 
gods as mysterious and unfathomable realities, but rather 
they habituate themselves and their activities to accepted 
custom in an attempt to render their activities automatic 
and predictable, the dawn of instrumental man.
Aristotle lived in a world where it was not difficult 
to pay homage to one political form while tacitly supporting 
its contradiction. Alexander was in the process of destroy­
ing the foundations of the political state, which served as 
the basis for Aristotle's Politics, through the most complete
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policy of conquest that had been known to that time. Im­
perialism contradicted the diversity of political units 
(the polis) that were the social fabric of the greatness of 
classical Greece. Greece rapidly became stagnant, both 
politically and intellectually partly because of the new con­
sciousness evidenced by the philosophies of instrumental 
control, which taken at their word, would have left little 
room for the further development of the poetic sensibility. 
The enthronement of the passion for control dethrones the 
passion for understanding, and the understanding is the 
most powerful force in the liberation of man from the domi­
nation of nature.
Conclusion
The origins of the instrumentalist tradition in 
Western philosophy lie deep in the Greek tradition, origi­
nating in Athenian Greece with the derogation of Homer, and 
reaching articulate form in the writings of Aristotle. It 
is important to see this tradition as a long one, present 
in the intellectualist Greek tradition as it merges with the 
spiritualist Hebraic to form that singular confluence that 
is our cultural heritage. One might also find the spiritual 
permission to dominate nature in the first book of Genesis 
(Genesis 1:26), and the discussion would lead to similar 
result: when the world, including man, is seen as something
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
to be dominated, as the field for the play of instrumental 
reason, it ceases to be an object of reverence. This loss 
of reverence characterizes our green age, despite what the 
poets can do to indicate "the possible."
The force that through the green fuse drives 
the flower
Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of 
trees
Is my destroyer.
And I am dumb to tell the crooked rose
My youth is bent by the same wintry fever.
Dylan Thomas
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ON THE O N TO LO G IC A L CHARACTER OF LABOR
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The union of Logos and Eros led already in 
Plato to the supremacy of Logos; in Aristotle, 
the relation between the god and the world 
moved by him is "erotic" only in terms of 
analogy. Then the precarious ontological 
link between Logos and Eros is broken, and 
scientific rationality emerges as essentially 
neutral. What nature (including man) may be 
striving for is scientifically rational only 
in terms of the general laws of motion—  
physical, chemical or biological.
Herbert Marcuse ^
One Dimensional Man
Instrumental Reason and Domination
Instrumental reason reigned supreme in the Aristo- 
telean and medieval world views in an ambiguous way: the
level of mastery over the natural environment was not yet 
highly developed, consequently the realm of human needs was 
not highly articulate and the religious and philosophical 
systems tended to devalue those dimensions of human activity 
concerned with the satisfaction of primitive needs. The 
Renaissance and the revolution in scientific and philo­
sophical thought that attended the decline of Catholic 
hegemony broke the hold of repression in many spheres of 
human activity, particularly in the relations between society 
and nature, and in the relations between species and indi­
vidual being. The most startling result of these changes 
was the development of a quantitatively certain and value-
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free science, and the diremption of human reality into the 
Cartesian categories, the dualities of which persist in 
human consciousness well into the twentieth century.
The development of a "value-free" science is, of 
course, the product of a value itself— the value of domi­
nation, mastery, and power over things in our world. Its 
major characteristic is the reduction of quality to quantity, 
the perception of nature as the source of use-values ac­
cessible through the language of mathematics. All matter is 
in motion, and motion is mathematically describable and pre­
dictable. The matter and the motion have no value in them­
selves, apart from that assigned them according to the 
satisfaction of human needs.
The realm of the mundane, from the point of view of 
medieval scholasticism, became the primary field for human 
activity from the sixteenth century on, and the realm of 
value, the world as object of reverence, became the mundane 
world of "subjectivity" from the point of view of the new 
science. This reversal of human interests is classic in 
form because it does not recognize itself as dialectically 
motile until the nineteenth century, and then originally 
only from the point of view of idealism. All things in 
the field of human consciousness that do not serve instru­
mental purpose (the domination of nature) are consequently 
devalued, and nature is exclusively perceived as the source
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of human use-values.
The domination of nature is an ambiguous phrase, made 
the more so by its original articulation in the book of 
Genesis (1:26), and its current popularity as descriptive of 
modern technology. The major problem with the phrase 
"domination" is, as William Leiss has pointed out, that 
only other men can, properly speaking, be the object of 
domination, since domination implies the conscious recog­
nition of the master's authority. Similarly, when we speak 
of man's domination of nature, we imply by our language a 
cohesive subject (Man as species-being) that does not exist. 
The reality is that men dominate each other (internal nature) 
in their attempt to render nature accessible to the demands 
of human utility. It is not science nor technology that 
dominate man, but man himself. Consequently neither science 
nor technology can accomplish the liberation of Man, al­
though both may be tools in the liberation of men.
When we speak of the domination of nature, we speak 
of the domination of men by other men; when we speak of the 
mastery of nature, we speak of the control of nature as 
source of use-value by men of an historically determinate 
social class. The reified language of sociology often over­
looks this rather obvious and important distinction, thus 
contributing to the notorious illusion that the mastery of 
nature is itself somehow mastered. The tension between
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species being and individual being that is also found in 
the first two books of Genesis as the created beings of 
Man and Adam, persists in our time more dangerously than ever 
before. It is all too possible for men acting in accordance 
with the dictates of their historically determinate needs to 
do permanent violence to the larger needs of species sur­
vival, and the consequence of that transgression would be 
as momentous as the expulsion from the garden of Eden.
Science represents the interests of eros, technology 
the interests of domination and mastery vis a vis the nat­
ural world— both internal and external, and for this reason 
they are not the same thing.^ Technology serves as the 
"concrete link between the mastery of nature through scien­
tific knowledge and the enlarged disposition over the 
resources of the natural environment which supposedly con-
5stitutes the mastery of nature in the everyday world." 
Technology is thus more immediately connected to the every­
day world of social conflict and repression, and therefore 
is more susceptible to the excesses of instrumental reason 
than is science.
Instrumental reason in its most virulently one- 
dimensional form announces the "demythologization of the 
world,"® the rendering of nature and human experience totally 
transparent to rational explanation, and the resultant 
derogation of all phenomenon not amenable to reason's
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approach. We have seen reason perform this reduction in 
the Oedipus Cycle, and traced its motion through classical 
Greece to Aristotle with the same result: with the approach
of radically instrumentalist reason, the world shrinks into 
mathematically manipulable constructions administered by 
human ingenuity for the apparent good of the species.
Mystery and ambiguity, rhythm and reverence exist only in­
sofar as they can present themselves as something control­
lable and beneficial, and even then their mystery is some­
thing to be attacked and reduced to verifiable knowledge. 
Openness to multi-dimensional reality is not consonant with 
the project of control and administration that dominates the 
drive for self-preservation and informs modern technology.
If nature is really as Descartes suggests, bodies in lawful 
motion, then the human project in terms of that nature is to 
develop mathematically verifiable methods of predicting the 
motion in order to render the world OURS.
The attempt to control nature through technology takes 
place in a social and historical context that promotes un­
reason. Man does not dominate nature, men do. And the domi­
nation is of internal nature, of other men as things to be 
administered and controlled. The object of the techno­
logical project, material security, is unattainable given 
the character of human needs in commodity culture, and the 
attempt to wield the world becomes increasingly irrational
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and pathological as competition for the planet's resources,
both human and material, becomes more fierce. The world no
longer appears hospitable;
The sustained effort of demythologizing in 
modern times ends by stripping the world of 
all inherent purpose. . . . The consequence 
of this view is to set the relationship of 
man and the world inescapably in the context 
of domination. . . .7
The situation we face is one in which the world has
become objectless, the competition among individuals for
economic security has rendered human intersubjectivity
problematic. The tangible sensuousness of the world is
superseded by mathematics, the openness and hospitality of
social relationships destroyed by an instrumental reason
gone mad with the will to domination. The individual human
being, still caught in the web of a psychological Car-
tesianism he cannot fathom cries out in vain:
Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning.
I, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, 
call them that. Keep going, going on, call 
that going, call than on. Can it be that one 
day, off it goes on, that one day ^ simply 
stayed in, in where, instead of going out, in 
the old way, out to spend day and night as far 
away as possible, it wasn't far. Perhaps that 
is how it began. You think you are simply 
resting, the better to act when the time comes, 
or for no reason, and you soon find yourself 
powerless ever to do anything again. No matter 
how it happened. It, say it, not knowing what. 
Perhaps I simply assented at last to an old 
thing. But I did nothing. I seem to speak, 
it is not I, about me, it is not about me 
(emphasis added).8
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Men are alienated and dominated in technological 
society, they have turned within, seeking in privatism and 
narcissism what the "polis" can no longer give them, yet in 
at least one way men continue to be free: in their labor
as artists. Artistic labor continues to offer authenticity 
and self-fulfillment in a world where there is little of­
fered elsewhere, in a world where the contradictions of the 
industrial state blind us to the realities of economic im­
perialism. Art continues to nurture the tension between 
what is and what ought to be, between form and content, 
and suggests to us an apotheosis of labor. Labor itself 
appears as an ontological category of human existence, 
whether that labor be authentic or alienated, free or ex­
ploited, rational or irrational. Through reflection on the 
character of labor generally, and artistic labor particular­
ly, we find what salvation there may be in the dissolution 
of post-capitalist technocracy.
Critical Reason and Labor
It seems macabre that the forces the Renaissance 
heralded as humanly liberating, should, five hundred years 
after their diffident appearance, be recognized as de­
humanizing. We nevertheless live that unfortunate eventu­
ality today, and see only theoretical solutions of dubious 
practical value. Those incredible powers of nature.
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harnessed and unleashed by man's sagacity, now stalk him 
with inexorable persistence in the shape of nuclear weaponry 
and the nightmare assembly line. The promised liberation 
from want, from material scarcity, has not been forthcoming, 
and does not appear on the horizon of the twentieth cen­
tury. In the attempt to dominate nature and render it trans­
parent to human needs, the self-domination of man has been 
effectively accomplished, and our specifically human in­
stitutions have lost sight of their generally human 
functions.
The ordering and consolidation of productive tech­
niques for the purpose of the domination of nature is called 
by Marcuse technological rationality, to which he posits two 
further forms of rationality which are not intrinsically 
contradictory: individual rationality and critical
9rationality. Individual rationality originally functioned 
as an attack upon feudal institutions that fettered the free 
development of human reason in all spheres of human activ­
ity, religious, political, economic, and scientific. The 
object avowed by the bourgeois rationalists was the liber­
ation of man from the established and stagnant status quo, 
consequently individual rationality was also critical 
rationality. Individual rationality eventually held sway, 
however briefly, and for a time during the Renaissance 
seemed to hold within it the promised liberation. But the
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promises of bourgeois liberalism were soon overshadowed by 
the realities of commodity production, which commodity pro­
duction was justified in the first instance by the desire 
to overcome the enslaving life-style demanded by the battle 
against scarcity. The first steps toward the realm of free­
dom* were taken self-consciously; the rationality that il­
luminated this self-consciousness was soon subsumed by the 
demands of the technology it deemed necessary to the task.
As economic units expanded in size, the founding rationality 
of individual freedom gave way to the necessities of indus­
trial production, i.e., individual rationality was trans­
formed into technological rationality, and peformed the fur­
ther service of an ideological justification of its opposite, 
the Protestant Ethic. Yet one must emphasize that the two 
modes of rationality are not, in their pristine and essential 
forms, mutually exclusive; the extension of nature under the 
domain of an instrumental reason that includes men as adminis­
tered energy makes them appear contradictory. However, this 
moment in the species life of human labor was a necessary 
moment without which the battle to overcome scarcity could 
never have been fought.
*The realm of necessity which Marx describes in Capital 
should have ended with the accumulation phase of capitalist 
development. Its persistence is not indicative of the impos­
sibility of realizing the realm of freedom, but rather is 
testimony to the increasing irrationality of capitalism in 
the dis-accumulation phase.
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At work in the transition from a free market economy 
is the "invisible hand of the market," Adam Smith's euphe­
mism for the mis-guided self interest and historical blind­
ness of eighteenth century intellectuals who sponsored the 
ideological dimensions of the individual rationality.
Individuals are stripped of their individuality, 
not by external compulsion, but by the very 
rationality under which they live. . . . True, 
the force which transforms human performance 
into a series of dependable reactions is an ex­
ternal force: the machine process imposes upon
men the patterns of a mechanical behavior . . . 
but man . . . relinquishes his liberty to the 
dictum of reason itself. The point is that 
today the apparatus to which the individual is 
to adjust and adapt himself is so rational 
that individual protest and liberation appear 
not only as hopeless but as utterly irrational.
The system of life created by modern industry 
is one of the highest expediency, convenience 
and efficiency. Reason, once defined in these 
terms, becomes equivalent to an activity which 
perpetuates this world. Rational behavior 
becomes identical with a matter-of-factness 
which teaches reasonable submissiveness and 
thus guarantees getting along in the prevailing 
order.10
Marcuse here indicates the danger of technology in 
another light, the Marxian notion of reproduction. Through 
his labor the laborer literally reproduces the conditions of 
his servitude and subsequently encounters the alientated 
product of his own labor in the commodity market as something 
he must purchase again. The further implication of the sub­
jective transformation that occurs in his attendance upon 
the productive apparatus will be considered later, but at 
this point we can anticipate the transformation as the
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virtual opposite of the transformation that occurs in the 
labor of the artist (providing that labor is not also 
alienated by the "art industry"). The stifling of human 
development within the productive process is not a ncessary 
consequence of that process per se, but is rather a func­
tion of a social organization which perpetuates an arti­
ficial scarcity and persists in an irrational conquest of 
nature. Marcuse advocates a revival of critical reason as 
one means of liberating man from domination by the social 
order— which domination is accomplished by and through the 
uncritical affirmation of an unjust and inhuman industrial 
administration. The truth of the domination of man is 
revealed by the domination of nature, i.e., its ordering 
methodology: " . . .  the cunning of unreason is revealed in
the persistent illusion that the undertaking known as the 
'mastery of nature' is itself mastered."11
Enough has been said in the past few years concerning 
the machinations of man in the face of alienated labor.
Much modern art can be seen as a reflection of that more 
pervasive alienation, and indeed the consequences of 
alienated and historically determinate labor have been seen 
as the futile destiny of Man expanded to ontological pro­
portions. The importance of alienated labor at this point 
is to note the extent to which we have been pushed back into 
our subjectivity in a desperate attempt to find there what
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has been denied us in the world of our creating. The re­
treat back into ourselves is really the loss of our sub­
jectivity, because we meet there the worm at the core of 
our being, a profound lack. What we are does not consist 
merely in some internal synthesis, opaque to the 'other', 
although there is that too, but also in our inter-subjective 
being, in our ability to communicate that hollowness, that 
numbing angst, with dignity and grace.
Labor is not essentially economic activity, and the 
problem in any consideration of labor is to overcome our 
historical prejudice to view it as such. This prejudice is 
born of the infatuation with classical and neo-classical 
economics, with an overscrupulous concern for the dynamics 
of the market place. The market place concerns the vast 
majority of Western economics for several obvious reasons; 
the implicit assumption that human needs are insatiable and 
that the locus for the unceasing satisfaction of those needs 
must be controlled; a penchant for quantitative methodol­
ogies that must operate on an ex post facto basis in order 
to have any 'data' with which to work; a recognition of the 
intractability of human motives which defies quantification 
and therefore necessitates a focus on the market place; a 
shared prejudice for objectivity which also characterizes 
the psychology which provides economics with respectable 
motivations— the list seems endless. Significant for our
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purposes is not so much what neo-classical economics chooses 
to address, as what it chooses not to address— the labor 
process.
The long historical prejudice in favor of objectivity 
and scientific methodology has prepared the way for an un­
critical economic theory. It is uncritical because it has 
not yet come to terms with the truth it describes, being 
infatuated with its apparent utility in the post-Keynsian 
world of managed economies, and it is a prejudice because it 
has become an apology for a politico-economic system the con­
tradictions of which now require a dazzling array of theo­
retical revisions. We now see the problem in terms of 
instrumental reason and realize the futility of an "objective" 
economics in a world where objectivity is the specious 
result of scientific symbology, mathematics. The metho­
dologies, like the Ptolemaic mathematics which buttressed 
that structure and were reincorporated into the new, appear 
no longer capable of bridging the chasm between theory and 
practice, resulting in considerable embarrassment for the 
dismal science.
Another Copernican Revolution is needed that will set 
the question anew. This new formulation of the question 
needs to be addressed not to the ends of labor as economic 
activity, but to the means through which these ends are pro­
duced. The prejudice for looking at human labor as
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exclusively economic activity is anachronistic, part of a 
cultural preoccupation with material scarcity and security 
that is deeply embedded in its history, and which must be 
overcome. It cannot be overcome by the perpetual recapi­
tulation of methodologies which focus on the products of 
human labor as if they appear magically. The realization of 
human labor as more than merely economic activity is con­
tingent upon abandoning the fetish for commodities and con­
cerning ourselves with the process in which man becomes Man. 
The move away from objectivity is not necessarily a move 
into subjectivity, but a move into an area of being where 
such dualities are mediated, nothing less than the restor­
ation of mythic unity.
Everywhere we find man we find him at work in the 
world, we find him laboring. A prior state, where the world 
is immediately given in its fullness without the mediating 
activity of human labor is conceivable only in a pre-mythic 
sense, only in terms familiar to us in the biblical imagery 
of Eden. The development out of Eden provides us with a two­
fold conception of nature as object of reverence and source 
of use-value. In the latter dimension we find labor as a 
necessary condition of human existence. As a necessary con­
dition of human existence labor is more than a specific 
human economic activity, it is a social and historial doing 
that encompasses man's entire Being and shapes his world.
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. . . Labor is precisely not a specific human 
'activity' (for no single activity comprehends 
and penetrates the totality of human existence 
. . .); rather, labor is that in which every single 
activity is founded and to which they again return; 
a doing (Tun). And it is precisely the doing 
of human beings as the mode of one's being in the 
world: it is that through which one first be­
comes "for itself" what one is, comes to one's 
self. . . . Labor here is not determined 
through the kind of its objects, nor through 
its goal, content, result, etc. but through 
what happens to the very human existence in 
labor.12
In this larger context labor is not exclusively 
economic in character, rather labor is an ontological cate­
gory of human experience, characterized by a primordial lack 
of existence. Marcuse's early essay (Telos 16, pp. 9-37) 
characterizes labor as having three essential moments: 
duration, permanence, and 'burdensomeness'. Labor's duration 
reflects its historical character as a flow of activity 
superseding any individual labor; its permanence is its 
character as a universal process, and its essential char­
acter of being a burden indicates the tyranny of the inter- 
subjective field in which labor takes place. Man labors 
because his existence is not passively, i.e., biologically 
determined, and he must make his world his own through the 
mediating activity of production and reproduction.
The tyranny of the intersubjective field is most evi­
dently the tyranny of domination in the economic dimension 
of human production and reproduction, in the necessary fact
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
of directing and directed labor in the battle with material 
scarcity. But labor is more than an economic activity 
taking place in the realm of necessity, it is also a pro­
cess rooted in the ontological condition of human existence,
and this primordial lack persists in the realm of freedom
where man still faces the facticity of his history as some­
thing other, something not of his own making.
The essential factual content of labor is not 
grounded in the scarcity of goods, nor in a dis­
continuity between the world of disposable and
utilizable goods and human needs, but, on the 
contrary, in an essential excess of human ex­
istence beyond every possible situation in which 
it finds itself and the world. Being human is 
always more than its present existence. It goes 
beyond every possible situation and precisely 
because of this there is always an ineliminable 
discrepancy between the two: a discrepancy
that demands constant labor for its overcoming, 
even though human existence can never rest in 
possession of itself and its w o r l d . 13
The goal of the doing that is labor is precisely 
human existence, self-realization of both the individual and 
species being that takes place both in the realm of neces­
sity (material production and reproduction) and in the realm 
of freedom which lies beyond necessity and yet is inextri­
cably reciprocal with it. The possibilities of the realm of 
freedom open upon man's true possibilities of self-reali­
zation only as an expression of the move beyond necessity, 
and as such what man may become is informed by what he must 
become. In the realm of freedom man is confronted still 
with his ontological condition, he must still create himself
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as that being who is persistently beyond his present, who 
always and everywhere lacks his existence. Yet in the realm 
of freedom man is able to become what he can become,
” . . .  praxis in the 'realm of freedom’ is the authentic 
praxis and 'goal' to which all other labor is directed: the
free unfolding of existence in its true possibilities."^^
Labor is man's mode of Being-In-The-World in whatever
shape that may take. The shape that it may take is not
determined by its specific objects, means, or ends, but
rather by what transpires in the process as it is lived, the
mutual transformation of both subject and object in the
unity of thought and action (praxis). When man labors in
the world, he objectifies himself there, "man 'objectifies'
himself and the object becomes 'his'; it becomes a human 
15object." But neither man nor his imagined goal, nor his 
activity nor the object ever leave the world which is al­
ready there and given to him as a human world. Nor does the 
philosopher, still less the artist ever leave the human 
world in describing it, and his labor is no less transforming.
Authentic labor is the historically conscious reali­
zation of individual and species being through the mutual 
and reciprocal transformation of both subject and object.
The realization of individual being implies conscious control 
over both the means by which the transformation is effected, 
and the human disposition of the end products. The
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realization of species-being implies the conscious affir­
mation of the historical destiny of the species, freedom.
The historically conscious realization of individual being 
requires the recognition of the context of past labor in 
which human life subsists, the processes of imagination and 
creation as well as the machinery and technical apparatus.
It requires further a consciousness of the limits of 
facticity imposed by the given world as something to be em­
braced or rejected and thus transformed. All human doing 
that is labor has a social context that is rational or ir­
rational according to the promise of the often occluded 
destiny of the species. The relation of social context and 
individual self-realization is a dialectical one in which 
truth emerges from the amorphous background of human history 
through the laboring individual— whether or not the indi­
vidual motives are informed.
Authentic labor is rarely realized at this moment of 
history, and when labor is seen from this more fundamental 
perspective it becomes apparent that alienated artistic 
labor is as prevalent as alienated industrial labor, and for 
the same reasons. Yet the dialectical tension that holds 
individual and species being in its dynamic relationship as 
human history unfolds, must consciously inform the inter- 
subjective field in which the human imagination identifies 
itself. We can imagine that dimension of existence for
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ourselves only so long as we recognize in the realm of 
necessity those elements which are no longer necessary and 
are therefore irrational. To the extent that we stand 
beyond the realm of necessity and recognize it as necessary 
but not yet sufficient for the satisfaction of our essential 
humanity, we fuel the flames of critical reason and strive 
for what we are not yet: free and self-consciously human.
In our commodity culture the characteristics of industrial 
alienation appear primary, and serve as the foil of artistic 
labor; but only where there remains critical rationality. 
This situation presents itself to us as one in which artis­
tic and technological labor appear contradictory both in the 
labor process and in the end products, but this contra­
diction is really part of a larger loss of historical con­
sciousness— we are historically lost in an age of discon­
tinuity.
Conclusion: The Intersubjective Field
Let us suppose that we had carried out production 
as human beings. Each of us would have in two 
ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1)
In my production I would have objectified my 
individuality, its specific character, and there­
fore enjoyed not only an individual manifes­
tation of my life during the activity, but also 
. . . the pleasure of knowing my personality to 
be objective, visible to the senses and hence a 
power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment 
or use of my product I would have the direct 
enjoyment of . . . having satisfied a human need 
by my work. . . .  3) I would have been for you 
the mediator between you and the species . . .
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recognized and felt by you yourself as a neces­
sary part of yourself, and consequently would 
know myself to be confirmed both in your thought 
and your love. 4) In the individual expression 
of my life I would have directly created your ex­
pression of your life, and therefore in my indi­
vidual activity I would have directly confirmed 
and realised my true nature, my human nature, 
my communal nature. Our products would be so 
many mirrors in which we saw reflected our es­
sential nature.16
In this extraordinary passage is reflected the trans­
formed consciousness of the free and self-determining human 
being. It is utopian only insofar as it presupposes the 
abolition of private property, the abolition of quantita­
tively determined measures of value for the quality of human 
production. The productive process takes on a new and uni­
quely human meaning, and the prejudice for the object, for 
the end product of human labor, vanishes before the fasci­
nation in the reciprocal interchange between individual and 
species being, between subjectivity and objectivity, and 
between individuals— characterized by love.
Qualitative descriptions are not accidental in this 
passage; there is a conscious move beyond the strictures of 
quantitative methodology to the heart of the matter con­
cerning human labor. The mystification is stripped away, 
and what is revealed is human intersubjectivity in all its 
marvelous complexity. Within the intersubjective field lies 
the possibility for the re-unification of instrumental and 
critical reason; for the reconciliation of technology and 
art.
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Art is committed to that perception of the 
world which alienates individuals from their 
functional existence and performance in 
society— it is committed to an emancipation 
of sensibility, imagination, and reason in all 
spheres of subjectivity and objectivity.i?
Technology is the vehicle which allows the possibility of 
such an emancipation, for in the realm of necessity where 
material scarcity predominates, there is no vision of eman­
cipation for species-being, and the emancipation of indi­
vidual being is contingent upon the domination of indi­
vidual beings. The alienation of individuals from their 
functional existence and performance in society allows for 
the recognition of relationships previously obscured by the 
productive process. The separation of art from the pro­
ductive process has allowed for the demystification of the 
social, historical, and material reality that is the result 
of that process.
Artistic labor is the apotheosis of all human labor, 
for while it is not primarily economic activity, the process 
of artistic production involves more dynamically than any 
other the critical and instrumental powers of human intel­
ligence. Because art maintains the critical tension between 
what is and what ought to be, it reflects on a higher level 
the ontological condition of man. Art, like all authentic 
labor, generally is the historically conscious realization of 
individual and species being through the mutual and
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reciprocal transformation of both subject and object. How­
ever, the function of art, its truth in the intersubjective 
field "lies in its power to break the monopoly of estab­
lished reality (i.e., of those who established it) to
18define what is real." As such art is a very special form 
of labor, the highest form, because it establishes itself on 
the frontiers of human consciousness where value meets the 
void of human possibilities.
The unity occluded by the excesses of instrumentalism 
has been preserved throughout human history by the redeeming 
power of art. The forgotten mythic unity can be reestab­
lished by aligning the productive processes in the realm of 
necessity with the ontological imperatives of human labor; 
by recognizing on the mundane level of life (on the level 
where men work and reproduce themselves) the values of 
artistic labor as that toward which all life approaches— the 
free expression of human potentialities. Reason in its 
highest expression.
Eventually all things merge into one, and a river 
runs through it. The river was cut by the world's 
great flood and runs over rocks from the basement 
of time. On some of the rocks are timeless rain­
drops. Under the rocks are the words, and some 
of the words are theirs.
I am haunted by waters.
Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It^^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3
Footnotes
^Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston, 1964),
p. 147.
2William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Boston,
1972), Chapter 5.
3Ibid., p. 122.
^Ibid., p. 146.
^Ibid., p. 145.
^See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (New York, 1972).
7Leiss, The Domination of Nature, pp. 150-51.
^Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (New York, 196 5),
p. 291.
^Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern 
Technology," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, vol.
14 (1941), 4 1 4 - 3 9 .
^°Ibid., 421.
^^Leiss. The Domination of Nature, p. 28.
12Herbert Marcuse, "On the Philosophical Foundation 
of the Concept of Labor in Economics," Telos, no. 16 (Sum­
mer 1973), p. 13. This essay is explicated in part below, 
and substantially influences what follows.
l^Ibid. p. 22.
l^Ibid., p. 31.
l^ibid., p. 13
^^Karl Marx, "Comments on James Mill, Elemens d ' 
économie politique," The Collected Works of Karl Marx, Vol. 3 
(New York, 1975), pp. 227-28.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 4
1 7 ,Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward
2  of Marxist
Ibid., p. 9.
a Critique  Aesthetics (Boston, 1978), p. 9. 
18
l^Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It and Other 
Stories (Chicago, 1976), p. 104.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 5
Bibliography
Leiss, William. The Domination of Nature. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1972.
Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1964.
The Aesthetic Dimension : Toward a Critique
of Marxist Aesthetics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978.
"Some Social Implications of Modern Tech­
nology," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, 
Vol. IX (1943), 414-39.
"On the Philosophical Foundations of Labor
In Economics." Telos, No. 15 (1973), pp. 9-37.
Marx, Karl. "Comments on James Mill, Elemens d'economie
politique." The Collected Works of Karl Marx, Vol. 3 
New York: International Publishers, 19 75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE IN T E R S U B J E C T IV E  F IE L D
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Introduction
The countless dualisms in Western philosophy suggest 
the tension in human thought prompted by the negating power 
of reason itself. The tension between reality and appear­
ance, light and dark, fact and value, freedom and necessity 
array themselves throughout history without final resolution. 
Our age suggests another dualism, rooted in the Greek tra­
dition and nurtured in the Renaissance, between the material 
and the ideal. To experience these dualisms is perhaps what 
it means to be human, it is a function of man's ontological 
nature to be always in process from what ^  toward what is 
not quite yet but ought to be.
The problem for a critical theory of society is to 
ground criticism in legitimate universality where it is it­
self free from charges of partiality, ideology, and particu­
larity. It is an open and continuing process that has not 
been realized, perhaps cannot be completely realized, but 
nevertheless ought to be. The attempt to ground critical 
theory might well begin by asking the question as to the 
object of that theory, i.e., of what is critical theory 
critical? The answer, as indicated by the preceeding 
papers, is domination. The unspoken ground of critical 
theory is an interest in human freedom as the ultimate 
human value.
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The dualism that critical theory must overcome is 
precisely that between fact (domination) and value (freedom). 
The problem inherent in this dualism involves the entire 
normative realm, since within a dominated social situation 
one might expect to have distorted perceptions not only of 
the material situation but also of that normative realm 
posited by the dominant culture to sustain itself. Where 
else can one stand when criticizing the dominating culture 
but firmly under its thumb? To appeal to history, or 
culture, is to appeal not only to that which offers the pro­
mise of liberation but also to that which has interests in 
the preservation of the status quo. One's own interests in 
the future are hopelessly tinged with the interests of the 
dominating social system that sustains the very notion of 
the future in the first place. The facticity of modern mass 
culture is overwhelming, both in terms of its material base 
and in terms of idealist destiny: both may appear as
rational and necessary.
The tension between a materialist theory of history 
(Marx).and an idealist theory of reason (Hegel) provides much 
of the fertile ground for critical theory. The attempt of 
the Frankfurt School to enfuse the Marxian critique of poli­
tical economy with a critique of culture resulted in a shift 
of emphasis that many felt did not preserve the unity of the 
two. Herbert Marcuse's 1933 essay "On the Philosophical
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Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics"^ was an 
attempt to ground critical theory in an analysis of labor as 
an ontological category, i.e., to expand the notion of labor 
in a way that would allow for a consideration of culture 
while maintaining the most fundamental category of histori­
cal materialism, labor. This essay has been criticized on 
various grounds, most notably for its "subjectivism," yet it 
nevertheless reflects the need for a critique of instru­
mental Marxism, for a critical theory of society and the 
individual which develops a philosophical examination of the 
foundations of historical materialism.
This is also the intention of Jurgen Habermas, whose 
work involves a linguistic examination of the foundations of 
historical materialism.^ Both Marcuse and Habermas see 
essentially the same problem in this regard: the need for
a philosophical basis for a critical theory of society that 
overcomes the tension between materialism and idealism with­
out sacrificing one for the other. Habermas replaces labor 
as the central core of critical theory with symbolic inter­
action and communication theory, arguing with extraordinary 
persuasiveness that language is a universal category of human 
experience (as is labor). The focus of both Marcuse and 
Habermas is clearly the intersubjective field where reso­
lutions of historical significance unfold through human 
praxis, and while both acknowledge the importance of material
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production and reproduction, both deny its exclusive primacy 
and reassert the socio-cultural dimension.
The historical moment of the Frankfurt School saw the 
emergence of a new attention to socio-cultural phenomena, 
a revived interest in psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, 
and art. The tremendous productivity of the group over­
shadowed the political-economic dimensions of life which, 
though not forgotten, were perhaps neglected in the effort 
to overcome the excesses of Soviet Marxism. The critique of 
instrumental reason became the primary task of critical 
theory, and resulted in the revitalization of the dialectical 
tension between culture and economics. But obviously the 
analysis of either side of the problem to the exclusion of 
the other results in no lasting understanding of the ad­
vanced capitalist industrial state. Both spheres of society 
must be understood as dialectically interdependent, which 
means the analysis must focus on a ground where idealism and 
materialism meet.
The thesis of this project is that the ground where 
culture and economics meet is human labor understood as the 
historically conscious realization of individual and species 
being through the mutual and reciprocal transformation of 
both subject and object— the definition of authentic labor.*
*See page 17, 18 of the second paper, "On the Ontological
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It is further suggested that the unacknowledged paradigm in 
the ideal speech situation described by Habermas is art, 
the previously described apotheosis of labor. The tremen­
dously subtle analysis of Habermas directs critical theory 
to a consideration of language, symbolic interaction, as 
the new focus of an analysis previously directed at con­
sciousness. The magnitude of his critical theory surpasses 
the narrow focus of this paper, and promises fertile ground 
for the future of all critical theory. The openness of his 
analysis promises the rebirth of an optimistic and erotic 
critical theory firmly grounded in the "intention of the
-jgood and true life."
Jurgen Habermas: Communication Theory
In light of Legitimation Crisis,  ̂ the problem of 
developing a Marxist aesthetic can now be integrated with 
the totality of the normative sphere which finds its ulti­
mate expression in the communicative ethic :
Only communicative ethics guarantees the gen­
erality of admissible norms and the autonomy 
of acting subjects solely through the discur­
sive redeemability of the validity claims with 
which norms appear. That is, generality is 
guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim 
generality are those on which everyone affected 
agrees without constraint if they enter into a
Character of Labor." Note that labor in this context is more 
than mere economic activity.
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process of discursive will formation. . . .  ^
Only communicative ethics is universal. . . .
In our own century the very possibility of intersub­
jectivity has come under devastating attack; philosophically 
in the ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre, and poetically in 
literature depicting the triumph of the art of failure. We 
have had our existential moment, thankfully, yet we curi­
ously linger with the aesthetic nostalgia of the old 
literary forms which hold open for us the mysteriousness 
of an impenetrable subjectivity as the illusion against 
which there can be only a mutilated and impoverished reality. 
We are reminded, with a similar yet possibly less perverse 
nostalgia, of the strange intercourse between Socrates and 
Euthyphro concerning the nature of Piety, that most inter- 
subjective of all the Greek virtues:
Socrates :
Euthyphro: 
Socrates:
Euthyphro: 
Socrates :
Euthyphro: 
Socrates:
Have we not also said, Euthyphro, 
that there are quarrels and disagree­
ments and hatreds among the gods?
We have.
But what kind of disagreement, my 
friend, causes hatred and anger?
Let us look at the matter thus.
If you and I were to disagree as 
to whether one number were more than 
another, would that make us angry 
and enemies? Should we not settle 
such a dispute at once by counting?
Of course.
And if we were to disagree as to the 
relative size of two things, we should 
measure them and put an end to the 
disagreement at once, should we not? 
Yes.
And should we not settle a question 
about the relative weight of two 
things by weighing them?
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Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Then what is the question which
would make us angry and enemies if 
we disagreed about it, and could not 
come to a settlement? Perhaps you 
have not an answer ready; but listen 
to mine. Is it not questions of the 
just and unjust, of the honorable 
and the dishonorable, of the good 
and the bad? Is not questions about 
these matters which make you and me 
and everyone else quarrel, when we 
do quarrel, if we differ about them 
and can reach no satisfactory agree­
ment?®
Running beneath all Socratic dialogues is the field of inter­
subjectivity that is the fertile ground out of which disa­
greements may grow, a ground that sponsors enough commonality 
to give rise to the fantastic diversity of classical Greek 
culture. The profound subtlety of Socrates presents us dif­
ference founded upon and rooted in the polis, the arena 
within which Greek humanity was realized. The dialogue con­
cludes inconclusively, of course, piety at least never gets 
reified.
But there is an interesting similarity between the 
ethical power which illuminates and nurtures Socratic wisdom, 
and the commitment of Habermas to the "good and true life," 
because it is ultimately that commitment which infuses his 
theory of communicative competence with truth.
For Habermas language is the peculiarly human medium 
of socially symbolic interaction which provides the field 
against and within which human life becomes intelligible. I
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use the term 'field' consciously and by doing so invoke the 
phenomenological notion of a field of perception within and 
against which intentionality operates, and concomitantly the 
field of history within which intentionality functions as 
future oriented motivation. There is both a certain 'given­
ness' about language and also a normative openness, as lan­
guage becomes both solidified as a cultural constant and 
the vehicle through which all cultural constants can be artic­
ulated and reconstituted. There is agreement between sub­
jects as to the use of symbols and features of language which 
is generative and capable of reconstruction in the case of 
degeneration (universal pragmatics). Universal pragmatics 
"exhibit both the normative basis of all communication and
7the possibility of systematically distorted communication."
The constitution of the field of consensus against
which language is operative is contingent upon the mutual
recognition of at least four different types of validity
claims involved in the exchange of speech acts:
Claims that the utterance is understandable, 
that its prositional content is true, and that 
the speaker is sincere in uttering it, and 
that it is right or appropriate for the speaker 
to be performing the speech act.
When all of these claims are accepted, as they are in normal
speech, communication occurs; when they are not they may be
restored through metacommunication which seeks to remove the
disturbance and reestablish the original or a new background
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consensus. The form of metacommunication in which the truth 
or correctness of an opinion or norm is established is called 
discourse— which differs from normal speech acts because it 
requires suspension of judgment as to the empirical context 
of the speech act, suspension of action and action oriented 
motivation which may occlude understanding and suspension of 
judgment as to the correctness of certain norms. Normal com­
munication, "context of interaction," naively accepts what 
in discourse is suspended, yet it always assumes that in event 
of a breakdown resort to metacommunication is always possible 
to reestablish mutual understanding. That this suppositional 
accountability is counter-factual, that pure communicative 
action rarely occurs, is acknowledged by Habermas, while he 
simultaneously holds that the expectation can be explained in 
a theory of systematically distorted communication. Language 
and the communicative field are not transcendental disem­
bodiments of cultural experience, but are sustained through 
consensus garnered in the existential social milieu through 
intersubjective reciprocity. This reciprocity is impaired 
by relations of inequality and domination, usually taking 
the form of repression which denies the possibility of con­
sensus, or at least makes problematic the cognizance of ap­
parent and real forms of consensus. In other words, the onto­
logical duality here is not absolute between two subjects 
since it is mediated by the intersubjectivity constituted
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communication process, yet equal access to the process, ac­
cess which would absolutely ensure authentic communication 
is in turn compromised by the inequalities of class, educat­
ion, motivation, and other factors. It becomes a matter of 
second nature to operate within a distorted language field, 
i.e., within a field where consensus is acknowledged as 
illusory.
Habermas' problem, in terms of the above-mentioned 
Socratic analogy, is to illustrate those possibilities for 
pure communicative action within a social situation where 
what is being measured is tinged with human interest— the 
agreement between Socrates and Euthyphro as to what measures 
to employ in matters of weight and volume, is of a quali­
tatively different kind than the agreement as to the nature 
of piety. Euthyphro, after all, is about to testify against 
his father in a murder trial. Which criteria of consensus 
are really true within a systematically distorted communica­
tion field, and how can discursively realized agreement be 
distinguished from the mere appearance of agreement?
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas maintains 
himself faithful to the core of the classical tradition of 
philosophy; to the insight that the truth of statements is 
linked in the last analysis to the intention of the "good
Qand true life." Argumentation is the means by which truth 
claims can become discursively justified or discursively
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redeemed. What is to be found in the notion of truth must 
be approached through an analysis of discursive justifica­
tion, which for Habermas is a normative concept: "Truth is
not the fact that a consensus is realized, but rather that 
at all times and in any place, if we enter into a discourse 
a consensus can be realized under conditions that identify 
it as a justified consensus. Truth means 'warranted asser- 
tability'.
The speech act carries with it the supposition that 
communication is possible. Discourse into the truth or 
falsity of a statement or the correctness of a norm similarly 
assumes the possibility of agreement— indeed the denial of 
this is tantamount to the denial of speech per se, and con­
demns itself as soon as it is uttered. The logic is the 
same whether we speak of speaking qua speaking or of an art 
which has as its object the abolition of itself. The irony 
of Samuel Beckett, for example, is that his novel that was 
to destroy the novel as an art form (The Trilogy) is an emi­
nently successful novel. So it is with metacommunication: 
the fact that we engage in it presupposes a belief on our 
part that the issue will be decided according to the rules 
of logic and the force of the better argument, and not by 
the contingencies of fetters on our communication. Our com­
munication is unfettered:
. . . When for all participants there is a sym­
metrical distribution of chances to select and
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employ speech acts, when there is an effective 
equality of chances to assume dialogue roles 
. . . (when) all participants . . . have the 
same chance to initiate and perpetuate dis­
course, to put forward, call into question, 
and give reasons for or against statements, 
explanations, interpretations, and justifi­
cations . . . (and) have the same chance to 
express attitudes, feelings, intentions . . . 
and to command, to oppose, to permit, to for­
bid, etc. ^
These are the conditions of the ideal speech situation, and 
are identical with the conditions for an ideal form of life; 
"they include linguistic conceptualizations of the tra­
ditional ideals of freedom and justice. 'Truth', therefore, 
cannot be analyzed independently of 'freedom' and justice 
Art, if it is to be authentic communication, has 
ideally the same requirements as pure communicative inter­
action. Not only can art be seen within this model of inter- 
subjective communication, but can also be as paradigmatical 
and can take itself as the object of its expression and 
thereby become a form of metacommunication of meta-art. When 
this happens, the result is often the destructing of a tra­
ditional field of aesthetic intentionality, and the speech 
with which art transforms itself often exceeds the communi­
cative competence of linguistic expression per se. Yet what 
is presupposed in the 'beautiful illusion' is precisely what 
is/^resupposed in normal communication, i.e., the ideal con­
ditions for an ideal form of life, the ideas of freedom and 
justice. These ideal conditions rarely, if ever, exist for
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art anymore than for actual speech, but as for actual speech 
they may serve as the ground from which systematic distor­
tions of aesthetic communication are critiqued. That ground 
assumes the inseparability of truth and goodness and beauty, 
of facts, theory, and practice, and is the ground for a 
critical theory of society.
Freedom is inherent in the notion of truth and is an­
ticipated in every act of communication— linguistic, prac­
tical, or aesthetic. All social relations must be accepted 
and legitimated by its members and as such the legitimation 
has a democratic character. When the democratic character 
of cultural affirmation is denied, it must be denied from 
the ground of an ideology that claims the impossibility of 
rational consensus, or the inappropriateness of discursive 
will formation; in short the ideology must be rooted in 
psychic repression and manifest itself in distorted communi­
cation (fascist art). Such communication abounds in modern 
capitalism, but its prevalence does not represent, even on 
the level of metacommunication, the ultimate ontological 
nature of human existence and interaction.*
*One of the/problems such writers as Beckett and Sartre pose 
is how bad fcaith can be overcome when bad faith postures be­
come internalized in a rapidly changing environment such 
that the original is irretrievably occluded. In such an 
instance we have Nietzsche's philological problem: the 
original is annihilated, so why pretend it exists?
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Habermas discusses the role of bourgeois art in terms 
of its autonomy in the face of demands extrinsic to art and 
in terms of its ability to strengthen the antagonisms be­
tween the values offered by the socio-cultural system and 
those demanded by the political and economic systems. Bour­
geois art operates as a form of critical rationality which 
stands over against and provides refuge from the techno­
logical rationality of the productive process and the polit­
ical ideology which gives it motivational credence. Against 
such technological rationality the artistic refusal often 
takes the form of un-reason (and indeed is frequently ir­
rational) , but generally only has the appearance of unreason­
ableness to a motivational system defined by an efficiency 
rationale. Habermas mentions the three main human and 
generalizable needs or interests thus served by bourgeois 
art in this capacity: 1) the need for a mimetic relation
with nature, 2) the need for living together in solidarity 
outside the group egoism of the immediate family, 3) the 
longing for the happiness of a communicative experience 
exempt from the imperatives of purposive rationality. This 
latter need elso reflects the deeply human and profoundly 
revolutionary drive for creative spontaneity. This char­
acterization of art has it fulfilling human needs which can 
find no satisfaction within privitized religion, scientistic 
philosophy, or utilitarian morality: "Thus, along with moral
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universalism, art and aesthetics {from Schiller to Marcuse) 
are explosive ingredients built into the bourgeois ideology.
But modern art for Habermas is post-Auratic art, art 
created under those conditions described by Walter Benjamin 
in his famous 1936 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction."^^ A consideration of this essay 
is necessary for a fuller understanding of Habermas' inade­
quately brief analysis.
Walter Benjamin: Mechanical Reproduction of Art
Benjamin argues that although works of art have al­
ways been in principle reproducible by imitation, the mechan­
ical reproduction of the work of art represents something new. 
Beginning with Greek founding and stamping, through the 
development of the woodcut, printing, engraving to the 19th 
century discovery of lithography, works of art were variously 
reproduced for various motives including profit. With litho­
graphy, it became possible to protray everyday life on a 
much more prolific scale, on a scale soon equivalent to 
printing. Lithography was soon replaced with photography, 
which for the /first time made the mediating labor of the hand 
superfluous, reducing its function to that of the eye looking 
through a lens. Photography implied the film just as surely 
as lithography implied the illustrated newspaper. By 1900 
all works of art could be mechanically reproduced, and the
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reproductive process itself became an art form. This had 
profound repercussions on the ways in which the public was 
to come to 'consume' art.
But all reproduction of a work of art lacks the 
"presence in time and space" of the original, i.e., the 
whole "sphere of authenticity" lies outside the possibility 
of reproduction (both manual and mechanical). Furthermore, 
the process of mechanical reproduction captures aspects of 
the original inaccessible to natural vision (for example 
enlargement and slow motion) while at the same time putting 
the copy of the original into situations which would be im­
possible for the original (for example listening to opera 
in the shower). The problem, and it is a significant one, 
is that the integrity of the original, its "quality of 
presence" is always depreciated:
In the case of the art object, a most sensitive 
nucleus— namely, its authenticity— is inter­
fered with. . . . The authenticity of a thing 
is the essence of all that is transmissible 
from its beginning, ranging from its substan­
tive duration to its testimony to the history 
which ^t has experienced. Since the historical 
testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, 
too, is jeopardized by reproduction when sub­
stantive duration ceases to matter. And what 
is really jeopardized when the historical 
testimony is affected is the authority of the 
object.
One might subsume the eliminated element 
in the term 'aura' and go on to say: that which
withers in the age of mechanical reproduction 
is the aura of the work of a r t . 15
Consequently, the work of art is wrenched from its
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traditional field, and in place of the unique object and the 
powerful experiences it exudes is substituted an uncon­
trolled number of ’faded' copies. (Again the iNietzschean 
analogy is apropos.) The copies now encounter the beholder 
in his own unique situation, reactivating themselves there 
and serving to shatter tradition. The implications in 1936 
were obvious : " . . .  the liquidation of the traditional
value of cultural heritage." The example Benjamin naturally 
seizes upon is the phenomena of the great historical film; 
an "invitation to a far reaching liquidation."^^
Modes of human sense perception change over long 
periods of time and in accordance with changes in modes of 
human existence. Benjamin argues that changes in the con­
temporary mode of perception can be understood as the decay 
of the aura caused not only by the mechanical reproduction 
of art objects, but further by the tremendous popularity of 
mass media. His worst fears would be confirmed by television.
Benjpmin draws the familiar analogy of the concept of 
aura to natural objects: "We define the aura of (natural
objects) as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however 
close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, 
you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon 
or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience 
the aura of those mountains, of that b r a n c h . T h e  social 
basis of the decay of the aura rests on two habits of mind
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characteristic of the contemporary masses: the desire to
bring things spatially and humanly closer, and to reduce 
the uniqueness of all art objects and situations to banality 
by accepting their mechanical reproduction. Benjamin saw 
this burgeoning penchant for the acquisition of close range 
likenesses multiplied everywhere; in magazines, newsreels, 
and films, and everywhere it demonstrated for him a pre­
ference for transitoriness and reproducibility over unique­
ness and permanence. "To pry an object from its shell, to 
destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose 'sense 
of the universal equality of things' has increased to such 
a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by 
means of reproduction. Thus is manifested in the field of
perception what in the theoretical sphere is noticeable in
18the increasing importance of statistics."
The transition from the uniqueness of the work of 
art which retains its aura to the total reversal of the 
function of art in the age of mechanical reproduction is 
the transition from ritual to politics. Since the original 
contextual tradition of art was expressive of the cult, and 
the work first appeared in the service of magical then 
religious ritual, the existence of the work of art is never 
entirely separated from its ritual function. The advent of 
photography roughly coincides with the advent of socialism, 
and the response of art is to become theological in defense
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of its aura which is now clearly threatened, i.e., art 
denies its social function and its categorization by subject 
matter and becomes 'pure'.
The consequent age of mechanical reproduction heralds 
the emancipation of the work from its dependence upon ritual, 
and becomes an object destined from its inception to be 
reproduced. This means that authenticity is no longer an 
ingredient of artistic creation which amounts to a total 
reversal of the function of art. "Instead of being based on
19ritual, it begins to be based on another practice— politics."
The two polar types of art distinguished according to 
value are works with cult value (ceremonial, cave drawings, 
religious statues, etc.) and works with exhibition value.
For the cave man the art work's importance was not contin­
gent upon its being exhibited; and today the cult value of 
a work seems to demand that it remain hidden. King Tut's 
tomb seemsy a classic example : with the liberation of most
art practices goes the increasing opportunity for them to 
be exhibited in settings other than the original, in the 
case of Tut it is impossible to send the entire pyramid 
around the world. One is also reminded of the obelisks in 
the center of Paris, brought there by Napoleon from Egypt. 
Obviously the same holds for a visual work done on canvas as 
opposed to one more permanently affixed to its setting, as 
a fresco. The increase in fitness for exhibition which is
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consequent upon increased capacities for technical repro­
duction has resulted in a qualitative transformation of the 
work's nature. Today the emphasis is exclusively on its 
exhibition, which means it now has entirely new functions, 
among which the one we are conscious of, the artistic 
function. We may well wonder at what point that artistic 
function will be transformed into an incidental function 
just as the cave drawing has now become 'artistic'.
Photography and the film are the obvious bearers of 
this new function, but with them, or at least with photog­
raphy, there is a retrenchment to the cult value in portrai­
ture. The portrait was the obvious focal point of early 
photography, and the aura of those early portraits still 
clings to the photograph long after it has been removed from 
its historical circumstance. But as soon as man absents him­
self from the photographic image the exhibition value mani­
fests itself. Benjamin reminds us of the haunting uneasi­
ness of photographs of empty streets, "taken as evidence at
20the scene of a crime." As photographs become the standard 
evidence of historical occurrences they begin to acquire a 
hidden political significance in which the viewer is chal­
lenged forth out of "free-floating contemplation" to another, 
more appropriate vision.
At the same time picture magazines begin to put 
up sign posts for him, right ones or wrong ones, 
no matter. For the first time captions have
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become obligatory. And it is clear that they 
have an altogether different character than 
the title of a painting. The directives which 
captions give . . . soon become even more ex­
plicit and more imperative in the film where 
the meaning of each single picture appears to 
be prescribed by the sequence of all proceeding 
ones.^1
All of this amounts to the destruction of the auton­
omy of art caused by the separation of art from its basis in 
cult: photography and the film have radically transformed
the entire nature of art, which can be seen nowhere as 
clearly as in the comparison of the stage actor to the 
screen actor. The screen actor's performance is presented 
not to the audience, but to the camera, to a camera that 
need not intuit the performance as a whole, and to a camera 
that constantly shifts its perspective, to a camera that 
does not establish intersubjactivity between actor and 
audience. ^Similarly, of course, the audience can no longer 
maintain the intersubjective symbiosis with the performers—  
which has powerful ramifications within the intersubjective 
field of the audience itself, i.e., it can totally abolish 
it. The audience identifies with the camera, or the camera­
man, who remains forever anonymous.^2
The actor for the first time creates for a mechanical 
contrivance with his whole living person, while that contri­
vance has no respect for the actor's aura. The aura, as we 
have already seen, cannot be reproduced, since it is rooted 
in the actor's presence. The aura of Othello and the aura
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
of Sir Lawrence Olivier on the stage cannot be separated, 
but when that performance is viewed by the camera of Polan- 
sky, both the auras vanish: art has left the realm of the
"beautiful semblance." It is called mirror estrangement; 
the estrangement of seeing before a mirror is compounded by 
the transportability of the mirrored image. The implications 
for politics are even more ominous than for art. How does 
the film industry, for whom these alienations are marketing 
problems, respond? By reconstituting the aura by artifi­
cially building the actor's or the candidate's personality 
outside of the performance, by packaging the commodity.
The extent to which the mechanical reproduction of 
ajTt has changed the reactions of the masses toward art is 
néwhere as evident as in the film, where the immediate fusion 
of visual and emotional enjoyment acquires tremendous social 
significance. The reluctance to adapt to innovations in 
painting is starkly contrasted with the immediate acceptance 
of innovation in the cinema:
The greater the decrease in the social signifi­
cance of an art form, the sharper the distinction 
between criticism and enjoyment. The conven­
tional is uncritically enjoyed, and the truly 
new is criticized with aversion. With regard 
to the screen, the critical and the receptive 
attitudes of the public coincide. The decisive 
reason for this is that individual reactions 
are predetermined by the mass audience response 
they are about to produce, and this is nowhere 
more pronounced than in the film. The moment 
these responses become manifest they controleach other.23
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The dark intersubjectivity of the theatre is the breeding 
ground for a universal critical aesthetic consciousness that 
is an impossibility even in the largest gallery. The single 
Picasso can be viewed simultaneously by a relatively small 
number of people (Benjamin sees the large numbers flocking 
to galleries at the end of the 19th century as a crisis in 
painting!), and was intended as such. It simply is not an 
object for a large simultaneous collective experience. In­
deed the crisis in painting is related to the fact that in­
sofar as painting is now an object of mass consumption, it 
is so in a radically different manner than ever before.
Today t^ere is no opportunity to approach painting gradually, 
through a period of lived experience in which meaning 
emerges distinctly, rather one encompasses "French Impres­
sionism" at the Chicago Art Institute in a single afternoon. 
"There is no way for the masses to organize and control 
themselves in their reception. Thus the same public which 
responds in a progressive manner toward a grotesque film is 
bound to respond in a reactionary manner to s u r r e a l i s m . "24
Benjamin's essay is considerably more positive in its 
anticipation of the human uses of the film and other mechan­
ical reproductions than was the response of Adorno and other 
members of the Frankfurt School who felt that the tra­
ditionally political function of art as providing the 
beautiful illusion of the "other" society was being abrogated
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by the new mass art. They feared the new political function 
of mass art was to be the reconciliation of the masses to 
the status quo. Benjamin disagreed. He lamented the loss 
of the aura while simultaneously holding out the hope for 
the progressive potential of politicized, collectivized 
art.^^ He does this by being more open to the positive 
character of what is undeniably a negative feature of the 
film, distraction. His analysis recognizes the impossibility 
of solving the problem of class consciousness by contem­
plation alone. Many of history's problems are mastered 
gradually, tjy living them through in accordance with a 
reasonable ^aith in human perception itself.
The return to Habermas is a return to the mainstreams 
of the Frankfurt School's aesthetic theory and critique of 
mass culture, but for us with the additional tool of his 
theory of communicative competence. His treatment of post- 
auratic art is cast in the social and cultural context of 
the 1960s and 19 70s, which means that post-auratic art finds 
at least partial expression in the counter-culture.
In the 19th century bourgeois art came to achieve a 
brilliant autonomy in terras of other contexts of interaction 
and employment external to it. Its values were characteris­
tically Bohemian, and as such grew directly out of the center 
of bourgeois culture as a radical negation of its motiva­
tional presuppositions: possessive individualism, the
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Protestant ethic, etc. The bourgeois work of art originally 
functioned as a kind of alter ego to the 19th century com­
modity owner, a corrective to the excesses of the productive 
process which characterized his intersubjective relations as 
relations of domination and repression and distorted com­
munication. In the pristine environment of the drawing room 
and the gallery the bourgeois could, through solitary contem­
plation reestablish contact with sublime humanity, with the 
species being which lurked behind his world on the side of 
its reverential nature. This original aura came to embody 
a critical attitude toward bourgeois values— a noisy and 
hostile howjling against the pretentions of repressively dis­
torted communication. Art became avant garde, seductive, 
and unalterably alienated itself from its patron. The 
bourgeoisie could no longer find in the artistically beauti­
ful its own redemption and happiness; that happiness was not 
simply suspended in everyday life, but was in fact crushed 
by it:
In the aura of the bourgeois work of art— that 
is, in the cultist emjoyment of the already 
secularized, museum-ripe shrine— was mirrored 
a belief in the reality of the beautiful il­
lusion. This belief crumbled along with the 
aura.̂  6
The truth is that bourgeois society cannot produce an art 
that would express the realization of human freedom through 
the apotheosis of technological rationality, because that 
rationality has stifled the possibility of its critical
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self-consciousness by forcing the ground of that self-con­
sciousness out into the cold night of unreason.
It is within the amorphous arena of 'modern art' that
bourgeois art is transubstantiated into the counter-culture.
Surrealism is the specific historical moment in which the
transubstantiation is affected, in which the "no-longer-
2 7beautiful illusion" passes desublimated over into life.
This destruction of aesthetic distance was not produced by 
the techniques of mechanical reproduction as Benjamin has 
argued, butjrather was already accomplished by the trans­
formation of the art work into a commodity relation with its 
consumer and producer. Mechanical reproduction certainly 
accelerated that process, but the break was already present 
at the point at which modern art made the process of pro­
duction evident by presenting itself as something that was 
produced, i.e., that has a use-value and has therefore sur­
rendered its autonomy. The point seems to be that both are 
correct, and that the relationship between modern ritualism 
(at least insofar as it reflects itself within the religious 
tradition) and politics is both discontinuous and at the same 
time anchored in an anti-human subjectivism that is counter­
revolutionary. Whether or not art concerns itself with the 
former, it can no longer refuse its political dimension. By 
presenting itself as something produced for consumption, art 
implicates itself in the commodity culture regardless of
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whether the initial art work was intended for mass pro­
duction. All art is now potentially reproducible, if by no 
other means than its recorded passage by the press and news 
media; and it is precisely this recorded and interpreted 
passage and its mass distribution that gives art its tre­
mendous political use-value. The work of art now no longer 
confoirms to one of the essential features of authentic 
labor, i.e., the artist no longer has control over the means 
of its production and reproduction and eventual distribution. 
This is the!context in which an alienated and distorted 
art must somehow find itself.
Conclusion
Renunciation of the aesthetic form does not 
cancel the difference between art and life—  
but it does cancel that between essence and 
appearance, in which the truth of art has its 
home and which determines the political value 
of art. . . .  A subversive counterculture to­
day is conceivable only in contradiction to 
the prevailing art industry and its hetero- 
nomous art. That is to say, a real counter­
culture would have to insist on the autonomy 
of art, on its own autonomous a r t . 28
Critical theory remains a critique of domination, but 
of domination understood in all of its forms economic, 
political, cultural, and artistic. As such it implies a 
human interest in the free expression of individual and 
species being. That expression occurs through authentic 
human labor now understood as an ontological category of
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human existence. Just as critical theory requires the bal­
ance of a critique of culture as well as a critique of polit­
ical economy, so too does Marxist aesthetics require a cri­
tique of artistic form as well as a critique of political 
content. A consistent feature of Marcuse's thought is his 
insistence on maintaining the dialectical tension between 
materialism and idealism in all dimensions of critical theory. 
Habermas also se4ks the ground of critical theory in human 
intersubjectivity, in 'symbolic interaction'. The significant 
force of Habermas' theory of communication lies in his 
description of the ideal speech situation, the unspoken para­
digm of which is authentic artistic labor.
It is significant that Marcuse, at the end of a long 
and productive philosophical life, turns to the aesthetic 
dimension, where art and radical praxis display such a be­
wildering affinity and opposition. Both envision a world 
where individuals are liberated from repression and domi­
nation; both acknowledge their roots in the given world of 
domination. Yet in the presumed utopia there will be art.
The institutions of a socialist society, even 
in their most democratic form, could never 
resolve all the conflicts between the univer­
sal and the particular, between human beings 
and nature, between individual and individual.
Socialism does not and cannot liberate Eros 
from Thanatos. Here is the limit which drives 
the revolution beyond any accomplished stage of 
freedom; it is the struggle for the impossible, 
against the unconquerable whose domain can never­
theless be reduced. . . .  If people were free, 
their art would be the form and expression of 
their freedom.29
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Of course, people are not free, artists no less than 
the rest of us; the ways in which we symbolically interact 
and labor are pre-determined by the medium of that inter­
action. The ideal speech situation, the ideal form of 
artistic labor exist only as values we might long for. We 
might long for them not as something lost in the 19th cen­
tury, but a^'^omething found in the changed communicative 
circumstances, of the 2 0th century. The age of instantan­
eous mass communication systems has altered forever the way 
we view ourselves and our human potentialities, and the 
artist must find new ways to ground himself and his work in 
these changed circumstances. The problem remains open and 
a solution, a resolution seems distant. We can only imagine 
what art might be in the "good utopia," in the realm of 
freedom. We can be as certain in our imaginings that there 
is an image as we can be when we enter tinot speech that 
there is communication, however inadequate. We can be just 
as certain that our symbolic interactions will be garbled 
and distorted in their present context, i.e., in the context 
of a dominated and repressed commodity culture, and we might 
suppose that art would take notice of the fact.
Artistic labor as defined in these papers is ideal 
only insofar as it evokes the memory what was in order to 
ground the image of what might be, of what ought to be.
Labor generally and art particularly will take radically 
different forms in our future history, if we have one, than
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it has in our recent past. It is difficult to find embodi­
ments of this future in our present— difficult but not im­
possible. There are artists who affirm Eros, who affirm the 
life force. As long as there are, art lives.
\
\
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7Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. xxiii, 27.
®Ibid., p. xiii.
^Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, appendix.
^^Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. xvi.
^^Ibid., p. xvii.
^^Ibid., p. xviii.
l^ibid., p. 78.
14Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1969).
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2°Ibid., p. 226.
Ẑ Ibid.
Z^lbid.f p. 228.
Z^Ibid., p. 234.
24lbid., p. 235.
2 5Martin J ^ ,  The Dialetical Imagination : A History
of the Frankfurtyschool and the Institute of Social Research, 
1923-1950 (Boston, 1973), p. 211.
^^Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 85.
^^Ibid., p. 85.
^^Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension; Toward 
a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Boston, 1978), pp. 51, 52.
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